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Fair Use and the New Transformative
Brian Sites*
ABSTRACT
In the eyes of many, the "transformative" subfactor of the fair use analysis is
expanding. Recent decisions uch as Cariou v. Prince, Seltzer v. Green Day, and
the Google Books line of cases have allegedly pushed the doctrine into new and
problematic territory. Given the subfactor's power in the aggregate fair use
analysis and its strong parallels to the goals of copyright law, the scope of the
transformativeness inquiry is critical to defining permitted uses under § 107.
Accordingly, this Article assesses the claims that Cariou et al. have modified the
scope of transformativeness. Part I paints, in broad strokes, the history of the
transformativeness subfactor. Part 11 focuses on recent copyright decisions and
concludes that some cases have expanded the doctrine of transformativeness into
new territory. Some of those modifications are inconsistent with prior decisions.
Finally, Part III considers paths to stabilize the transformative subfactor.
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Fair use is a doctrinal pifiata. Recently, the motivation for courts and
commentators to line up and take a swing has been Cariou v. Prince, Seltzer v.
Green Day, and numerous search-related cases; their battle cry in the ensuing
volley has been that the transformativeness inquiry under § 107(1) of the fair use
doctrine has stretched too far.' If, as other commentators have suggested, fair use
is a muscle that was strengthened by use, it might now be strained by over-
extension.2 Commentators have criticized the murkiness and secondary effects of
these cases' standards3 and speculated whether, in light of them, Congress should
modify the fair use doctrine.4 This alleged expansion can be cast as a positive
1. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651, 652, n.4 (2015)
(collecting sources); Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 829
(2015) (same); Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual
Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 92, 95 (2014); Jennifer Pitino, Has the Transformative Use Test Swung the Pendulum Too
Far in Favor of Secondary Users?, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 2013, at 26, 29-30; Barry Werbin, Seltzer v.
Green Day: Ninth Circuit Expands Copyright "Transformative" Fair Use to Street Art Embedded in
Music Video, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, Oct. 2013, at 13; see also Jacqueline Morley, The
Unfettered Expansion of Appropriation Art Protection by the Fair Use Doctrine: Searching for
Transformativeness in Cariou v. Prince and Beyond, 55 IDEA 385, 397-98 (2015); Benjamin
Moskowitz, Toward A Fair Use Standard Turns 25: How Salinger and Scientology Affected
Transformative Use Today, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1057, 1088-91 (2015).
2. Cf Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 874 (2015)
(making this analogy based on Peter Jaszi and Pat Aufderheide's comment, but not arguing that courts
have strained fair use or transformativeness).
3. See, e.g., Anthony R. Enriquez, The Destructive Impulse of Fair Use After Cariou v. Prince,
24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 47 (2013).
4. See, e.g., Edward E. Weiman, Transforming Use: The Google Books Cases Have Created A
New Area of Controversy Regarding the Transformative Use Defense to Copyright Infringement, Los
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trends or as problematic,6 but however framed, there is a growing belief among
many that these cases reflect a fair use doctrine mutating at its edges.' This
diagnosis arises at a time when many entities are already contemplating amending
the Copyright Act.8
Even removed from the cases lying at its boundaries, fair use is regularly seen as
unpredictable by artists, attorneys, and the general public.9 The transformativeness
inquiry shares that reputation: the leading copyright treatise describes it as being so
malleable as to be "all things to all people."'0 Although the predictability of fair
use is itself a topic of debate, that such a debate exists says something about fair
use's predictability.''
That uncertainty has a price. A 2014 report by the College Art Association
found that a significant portion of the art community, broadly defined, has avoided
or abandoned works because of copyright concerns, including: one-third of visual
artists and visual art professionals, one-fifth of artists generally, over one-half of
editors and publishers, and over one-third of art historians.12 A meaningful part of
that confusion stems from uncertainty about the parameters of fair use.13  It
reportedly leads to art historians avoiding writing historically oriented texts,
graduate students being warned away from certain topics, a perceived decline in
academic freedom, self-censoring among editors, avoidance of certain artists and
genres amongst museum curators, and artists settling for "inferior substitutes when
permissions to incorporate copyrighted visual material ... have been requested and
refused."'4  Separate from whether fair use is too broad or too narrow, "the
ANGELES LAWYER, June 2014, at 16.
5. See, e.g., Andrew Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich and Fabulous?, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 88, 93 (2013); cf Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104
GEO. L.J. 355, 396-408 (2016) (advocating for a fair use test that would be even broader than Seltzer's).
6. See, e.g., Kathleen K. Olson, The Future ofFair Use, 19 COMM. L. & POL'Y 417 (2014).
7. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 883-84.
8. See, e.g., USPTO & Dep't of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, White Paper on
Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Jan.
28, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/copyright/white-paper-remixes-first-
sale-and-statutory-damages [https://perma.cc/33UU-D8EF] (recommending amending the Copyright
Act as to statutory damages); Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, The Register's Call for Updates
to US. Copyright Law, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Mar. 20, 2013), http://copyright.gov/regstat/2013/
regstat03202013.html [https://perma.cc/NLB7-XZ5G] ("My message is simple. The law is showing the
strain of its age and requires your attention.").
9. See, e.g., Copyright, Permissions, and Fair Use among Visual Artists and the Academic and
Museum Visual Art Communities, COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION (February 2014), http://
www.collegeart.org/pdf/FairUselssuesReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTB7-WQ8C]; see also Bouchat v.
Bait. Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Jan. 14, 2014).
10. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][B] (2002)
(quoting Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525, 1670 (2004)).
11. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 875 ("[Flair use provides enough certainty that ordinary
people can go about their day-to-day business using common sense, just as they can usually do so with
respect o other incompletely specified legal regimes . . . .").
12. COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 5.
13. Cf COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION, supra note 9 at 7-9.
14. COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 9.
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Progress of Science and the useful Arts" 1 5 is hindered when fair use is too
confusing.16 Inconsistency in the case law applying fair use does the doctrine's
predictability no favors.
Accordingly, this Article intervenes for the pifiata to ask whether the recent
barrage is warranted. To do so, it assesses whether the transformativeness inquiry
has changed in recent cases. Part I paints, in broad strokes, the history of fair use
and the transformativeness ubfactor. In doing so, the Article emphasizes the cases
arising after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music given that case's central status in the
modem doctrine.17  Part II focuses on several recent copyright decisions and
juxtaposes them with prior cases to highlight shifts in the definition of
"transformative." Ultimately, the Article concludes that the transformativeness
subfactor has expanded in ways that are inconsistent with prior cases. Part III
recommends ways to alter the new approach to the transformativeness inquiry to
parallel the goals of copyright law.
I. THE OLD TRANSFORMATIVE
A. FAIR USE INTRODUCED
Fair use has been portrayed in divergent lights. Some have argued it is a plague
on authors' rights, while others have labeled it the lifeblood of the creative engine.
Procedurally, it is generally treated as an affirmative defense to copyright
infringement.18 However, fair use is not merely a defense, but instead a central part
of the balance copyright law strikes between promoting author remuneration and
enabling the evolution of art and the public good flowing therefrom, much of which
occurs-especially now-when one author can build upon the works of another.19
In short, fair use is a key piece of modem domestic copyright law. And it is not
a new phenomenon. Fair use in the United States is an incarnation of the English
doctrine of "fair abridgment" deriving from the 1710 Statute of Anne.20 It has been
enshrined in the Copyright Act since 1976, but the first formulation of fair use in
the United States is much older and is generally attributed to Justice Joseph Story's
description in Folsom v. Marsh.2 1
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
16. See Bill Graham Archives v. Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006).
17. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
18. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). But see Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An
Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REv. 685 (2015) (arguing that fair use should not be seen as an
affirmative defense); Samuelson, supra note 1, at 853-54 (2015) (same, citing Loren).
19. The tools available to today's creators make it easier than ever to use another's work as raw
material for your own. Two examples of that trend are the rise of user-generated websites like YouTube
(and the massive amounts of user-generated content therein) and the continued popularity of
appropriation art. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 2006); Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns.
Int'l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002).
20. WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE (Thomson West 2015 ed.).
21. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841)). But see PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 20, at 54 n. I (attributing "many of the points
[39:4516
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It seems, though, that fair use was born under a foul moon. Even from its early
hours, it was lamented as "one of the most difficult points, under particular
circumstances, which can well arise for judicial discussion."22  It has never
outgrown that obfuscating shroud,23 but instead wears its malleable nature as a
badge of honor: the doctrine's flexibility allows it to cover a range of situations.24
Which direction it will bend, however, is not always foreseeable.
The test itself is simple enough to recite:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.25
In assessing whether a work is a fair use, courts primarily consider those
statutory factors, but hey may also consider others.26  Courts avoid bright-line
rules in the fair use determination and instead favor case-by-case determinations.27
In weighing the factors, courts must not consider them in isolation and instead
should explore them together "in light of the purposes of copyright."28  For
example, if a use is significantly different in purpose under the first factor, that
suggests a lower likelihood of market substitution under the fourth factor.29 Thus,
raised in Folsom" to a case Justice Story penned two years prior, Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035
(C.C.D. Mass. 1839)).
22. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345.
23. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that "there
is no shortage of language from other courts elucidating (or obfuscating) the meaning of (the first fair
use factor]" in the court's attempt "[t]o navigate these treacherous waters"); Princeton Univ. Press v.
Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Fair use is one of the most unsettled
areas of the law... . The potential for reasonable disagreement here is illustrated by the forcefully
argued dissents and the now-vacated panel opinion."); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661,
662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam) ("[Tlhe issue of fair use ... is the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright.. . .").
24. Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2015).
26. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Harper & Row Publishers
Inc., 471 U.S. at 560.
27. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
28. Id. at 578.
29. See, e.g., id. at 591; see also Fox News Network v. TVEyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379, 394
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that "where the creative aspect of the work is transformed, as is the case
here, the second factor has limited value").
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the factors are weighed together and considered holistically.
B. TRANSFORMATIVENESS DEFINED
Much of the recent debate surrounding § 107 centers on its first factor and, in
particular, a subfactor thereunder called "transformativeness" that is not expressly
enumerated in the statute. Courts have characterized the transformativeness inquiry
many ways. The most common definition comes from Campbell, which borrowed
it from earlier sources including Folsom and a highly influential article by Judge
Leval.30 That definition states:
The enquiry [under § 107(1)] may be guided by the examples given in the preamble to
§ 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or news reporting, and
the like. The central purpose of this investigation is to see . .. whether the new work
merely "supersede[s] the objects" of the original creation, . . . or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is "transformative."31
Or, as the Second Circuit described transformativeness, the test asks whether
"the secondary use adds value to the original-if [copyrightable expression in the
original work] is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information,
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is the very ty e of activity that
the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society."
However, courts have disagreed, both in practice and in definition, about what
qualifies as transformative.33  "The plethora of cases addressing
[transformativeness] means there is no shortage of language . . . elucidating (or
obfuscating) the meaning of transformation."34 Although the precise definition of
transformativeness is debatable, it is clear that it has significant influence in
modem fair use analysis,35 and the transformativeness subfactor wes much of that
prevalence to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.36
30. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
31. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
32. Castle Rock Entm't., Inc. v. Carol Publ'g. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Pierre N. Leval, Towarda Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
33. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216 n.18 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
2016 WL 1551263 (Apr. 18, 2016) (critiquing Seventh Circuit's description of transformativeness);
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (critiquing Second Circuit's
transformativeness analysis in Cariou), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015).
34. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176(9th Cir. 2013).
35. See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended
(Jan. 14, 2014) ("Our precedents have placed primary focus on the first factor."), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2319 (2014). But see Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (noting that transformativeness is "not one of the
statutory factors" and expressing skepticism about its level of importance).
36. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; see, e.g., Zahr K. Said, Foreword: Fair Use in the Digital Age,
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose at 21, 90 WASH. L. REV. 579, 582 (2015); Niels Schaumann, Fair Use and
Appropriation Art, 6 CYBARIS 112, 127 (2015); Stephen McJohn, The Case of the Missing Case:
Stewart v. Abend and Fair Use, 53 IDEA 323, 324 (2013).
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In Campbell, the Court characterized the transformativeness subfactor as "not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, [but] the goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright [law]."3 By thus
characterizing transformative works as residing "at the heart of the fair use
doctrine,"38 the Court breathed significant life into the transformativeness inquiry.
Transformativeness subsequently has grown into one of the two defining
inquiries under § 107 .39 And recent studies have confirmed what copyright
devotees have suspected for years: whether a new work is transformative is a
central, often dispositive, part of the fair use analysis in the eyes of most courts.40
A central concept animating the latitude given to transformative uses is the idea
that such uses frequently promote "the novelty copyright seeks to foster" and "are
less likely, generally speaking, to negatively impact the original creator's bottom
line, because they do not merely supersede the objects of the original creation and
therefore are less likely to supplant the market for the copyrighted work [by]
fulfilling demand for the original." 41 However, courts have encountered a number
of obstacles in applying Campbell's transformativeness doctrine.
Modifications and Interpretive Perspective
One of the core issues in determining whether a use is transformative is the
question of whether a second work must:
(a) transform the content of the original (such as changing the colors and
otherwise modifying the content of the original, or cutting the original into
pieces and using those pieces in a collage),42
(b) transform the purpose of the original (such as by using elements of the
original for a new purpose, like in a parody that mocks the original),4 3 or
37. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 579.
39. See, e.g., Bunker & Calvert, supra note 1, at 93 ("A key element in the [court's] fair-use
determination, as is now standard practice in the federal judiciary, was whether [the defendant] had
engaged in a 'transformative use"' of the plaintiffs work.). The second is the impact on the market
under § 107(4). See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 471 U.S. at 566.
40. See, e.g., Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the
Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 260, 262, 292 (2012); R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work
Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 485 (2008).
41. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original,
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1551263 (Apr. 18, 2016) ("[A] transformative use is one that
communicates something new and different from the original or expands its utility, thus serving
copyright's overall objective of contributing to public knowledge.").
42. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2013) (changing the
appearance of the original visual art but arguably not significantly changing its meaning).
43. See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (parody of
Gone With The Wind).
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(c) both of the above.44
These categories can be thought of as "content transformativeness" and
"purpose transformativeness," respectively.45 Courts have recognized fair uses that
fall in each of these camps, but it is not always clear what threshold of change is
required for each category.
For example, when photographs of a couple's secret wedding were used in a
celebrity magazine along with the addition of headlines, captions, and minor
cropping, the court deemed the use not transformative.46 Although material was
added, the images were cropped, and the second use was for a new purpose (news
reporting), that was not sufficient in the court's eyes.47 Conversely, in Blanch v.
Koons, the Second Circuit held that a work was transformative where it made
several aesthetic changes to the original, used it in a collage with other works, and
had a different purpose than the original (commenting on the nature of
consumerism and related issues as opposed to advertising).48 Other times, lesser
changes were accepted, such as changing the theme, mood, and tone of a song,
even where the two works had similar purposes.49
However, some uses need not alter the original work at all for the second use to
be deemed transformative.50 A series of courts have held that using an original in a
searchable database was transformative even where the work was unaltered (or was
only scaled down in quality, such as a lower-resolution image).51 Similarly,
archiving students' papers in a database to check subsequent works for plagiarism
was transformative even without alteration of the papers.52 There are three key
threads in these cases. First, these uses were at least partially for a different
purpose than the original use (finding sources as opposed to reading or viewing
those sources; detecting plagiarism as opposed to being a history report, etc.).
Second, the new uses were generally beneficial to the public: they facilitated
finding sources or deterred plagiarism. Finally, the uses were expression-
ambivalent because they were "completely unrelated to [the] expressive content"53
in the originals. The databases arguably did not care what the texts said or the
images depicted; they cared only that they were fodder for the database.
44. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (using the original in a collage to
comment on society and the original's genre).
45. See generally Tushnet, supra note 2 (using these terms).
46. Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012).
47. Id.atll75-76.
48. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
49. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 2009)
(noting that the allegedly infringing work was "certainly transformative" because it "ha[d] a different
theme, mood, and tone from [the original song]").
50. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); A.V. v. iParadigms,
LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009).
51. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Arnazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
52. A. V., 562 F.3d at 638-40 (4th Cir. 2009).
53. Id at 640; see also Brian Sites, Google the Gozerian and Fair Use Slimed: Copyright Again
in the Technocrat's Den, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 31, 48 (2006) (noting that Google was "us[ing] copyright-
protected materials in total disregard for what those materials say, stand for, invoke or represent . . .").
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Thus, though there is some inconsistency as to how much a second user must
change an original for those changes to warrant a finding of transformativeness,
courts generally agree that a change in purpose is relevant to the analysis, and a
failure to modify the content can be probative of whether there is a transformation
in purpose.54 As to physical modification of the prior work, generally the more
changes the better in the eyes of fair use.55
In analyzing the purpose of the works, courts also wrestle with how to interpret
them. For example, in determining the "purpose and character of the use," which
perspective matters? What the artist intended the work to mean; what a reasonable
person would perceive; what the audience actually perceived; or some other
approach? Many courts have looked to what the audience or a reasonable observer
would think about the work, especially in parody cases.56  Other courts have
emphasized what the artist intended as the meaning.57 Still others appear to have
looked to both what the artists intended and whether a reasonable person would
perceive that message.5 8  As is discussed further in Parts 11 and III, which
perspective is used can dramatically impact the outcome of the transformativeness
subfactor.
Courts have wrestled with these issues for years. Amidst these interpretations,
they have sought clarity by looking to the definition of transformative in Campbell,
the primary beacon for that term's meaning.5 9 Unfortunately, Campbell casts too
little light to wholly banish the shadows surrounding § 107(1), and recent cases
illustrate the resulting analytical difficulties.
54. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm't., Inc. v. Carol Publ'g. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir.
1998) ("[T]he fact that [the Seinfeld trivia book at issue in this case] so minimally alters Seinfeld's
original expression ... is further evidence of [the trivia book]'s lack of transformative purpose.").
55. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (significant changes were
enough to hold that twenty-five of thirty works were transformative, but lower level of changes in other
five warranted remand for further consideration by district court).
56. See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013) ("Rather than confining
our inquiry to [the appropriation artist's] explanations of his artworks, we instead examine how the
artworks may reasonably be perceived in order to assess their transformative nature.") (internal
quotations omitted); see also Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013); Mattel,
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003).
57. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd.
P'ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Jan. 14, 2014); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83
(2d Cir. 2010). It is often difficult to tell if a court was focused on only intent because the court
describes its analysis in a way that could be said to treat the court's observations as the readerlaudience.
Compare SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268-69 ("For purposes of our fair-use analysis, we will treat a
work as a parody if its aim is to comment upon or criticize a prior work by appropriating elements of the
original in creating a new artistic, as opposed to scholarly or journalistic, work.") with id. at 1268
("[Tihe Supreme Court has required that we ensure that 'a parodic character may reasonably be
perceived' . . . [to deem it a parody].").
58. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251-53, 254-55, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the
artists' intent in detail, but also citing in support quotes such as "parody of a photograph in a movie
poster was transformative when the ad [was] not merely different; it differ[ed] in a way that may
reasonably be perceived as commenting on the original") (emphasis added, internal citation omitted).
59. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013).
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II. THE NEW TRANSFORMATIVE
In recent years, courts have openly challenged each other's competing attempts
to properly define transformative uses.60 Two genres of uses have generated the
bulk of the controversy: search engine-style cases and appropriation art cases. As
explained below, the search engine cases are arguably consistent with prior case
law, but the appropriation art cases have caused a doctrinal divide. This Part
compares whether these recent cases have diverged from prior jurisprudence in
their transformativeness analysis.
A. SEARCH ENGINE AND RELATED CASES
One of the major growth areas in the fair use menagerie in the last several years
has been a host of cases involving search engines, robotic readers, and related
uses.61 For example, in HathiTrust and Google Books, the courts addressed claims
stemming from millions of books being scanned into databases that fueled search
engines and related projects.62 The courts held that the use of full copies of books
in such search engines served a different purpose than the books' original uses.63
Similarly, courts have also upheld as fair uses copies made in other databases
pertaining to legal briefs and news tracking.64  Some other cases involving
"selective copying without alteration of the content of the copied work ha[ve] also
succeeded."6 5 As noted previously, what these cases generally have in common is
that they were ambivalent to the expression in the works-the databases were a
bucket of text or pixels, and the databases' primary concerns were enabling users to
search the bucket, not convey the expression that the text or pixels communicated.
Although not all such uses have been held to be transformative, and some cases
have faulted these types of uses for failing to add new creative content,66 most of
the recent court decisions in this area have found search engine and related tools to
60. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016
WL 1551263 (Apr. 18, 2016) (critiquing Seventh Circuit's description of transformativeness); Kienitz,
766 F.3d at 758 (critiquing Second Circuit's transformativeness analysis in Cariou), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 1555 (2015).
61. See generally James Grimmelrnann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REv. 657
(2016).
62. See generally Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016
WL 1551263 (Apr. 18, 2016); Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild,
Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
63. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87; Author's Guild, 804 F.3d at 216-19; see also Olson, The Future of
Fair Use, supra note 6, at 422.
64. White v. W. Pub'g Corp., No. 12 CIV. 1340 JSR, 2014 WL 3057885 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2014)
(upholding fair use as to legal briefs); TVEyes, 43 F. Supp. 3d 379 (upholding fair use as to news
tracking). Other aspects of the service provided by TVEyes were not a fair use, however, and the matter
is on appeal to the Second Circuit as of February 2016.
65. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 877 nn.38-44 (collecting cases).
66. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198-99 (3d
Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 19, 2003) (finding not transformative the use of video clip previews of
movies in a database context because the clip previews overlapped in purpose with the purpose of movie
trailers made by the copyright holders).
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be transformative.
These recent rulings have been the subject of some debate outside of court
decisions as well, much of which ultimately centers on normative questions about
what fair use should reach. The cases themselves, however, are arguably consistent
recently and with prior cases. For example, in earlier search-related cases, courts
upheld as transformative uses of images reproduced for search engine websites.67
The courts concluded that the websites aimed to help users find sources, which was
a completely different purpose than the original sources served (e.g.
entertainment).68 Most of the recent cases have followed suit under generally that
same rationale,69 and can also trace roots back to jurisprudence of much older
vintage.70 These results are also notable in that they arise across circuit courts,
some of which have disagreed at times as to the role or scope of
transformativeness.71 Accordingly, as to these recent cases, courts are on an
arguably stable path-though commentators are not in agreement about whether
these cases should be transformative uses, and these issues are the subject of
ongoing dispute.72
B. APPROPRIATION ART: SELTZER V. GREENDAY
Other recent decisions have not proven so constant, especially in the area of
appropriation art. Appropriation art is generally defined as "the more or less direct
taking over into a work of art a real object or even an existing work of art."73 For
example, in Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed the use of a
visual work called Scream Icon, which depicted a screaming face and was meant to
be iconic of skaters and street art.74 A second artist, Roger Staub, photographed a
weathered version of the original, added a spray-painted cross and some streaks,
changed the coloration, and used the modified version to "dominate" "the center of
the frame" of a video about the hypocrisy of religion, which was played as the
backdrop during a particular song, East Jesus Nowhere, in band Green Day's rock
concerts.75 The artist explained that his "goal was to convey the song's 'mood,
tones or themes,"' which were "'the hypocrisy of some religious people who
preach one thing but act otherwise [and] ... the violence that is done in the name of
67. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811.
68. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811.
69. See, e.g., A. V., 562 F.3d at 639 (citing Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165).
70. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D. N.J. 1977)
(addressing an index of an index); see also Sites, supra note 53, at 63 (applying this case to the Google
Books controversy).
71. See infra notes 73-172 and accompanying text (contrasting Seltzer, Cariou, Kienitz, and other
cases).
72. See, e.g., Fox News Network LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., No. 15-03885 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2015)
(notice of civil appeal by TVEyes); Fox News Network LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., No. 15-03886 (2d Cir.
Dec. 3, 2015) (notice of cross-appeal by Fox News Network).
73. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting the Tate Gallery).
74. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2013).
75. Id at 1174.
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religion."'76 The video was played at approximately seventy concerts and during
Green Day's performance at the MTV Video Music Awards.7 7 The Ninth Circuit
held that this use was transformative, concluding the original work "sa[id] nothing
about religion" while the new use did; thus, the video literally added "new
expression, meaning, or message."78
Normative judgments aside, this result is perplexing. First, the Ninth Circuit
seemed to gloss over key facts, such as that Staub "studied the [band's] album art,
which use[d] graffiti and street art as significant visual elements."79 Scream Icon,
too, was meant to be street art.80 If Green Day's album used street art, then Staub's
use of street art in the tour video related to that album was likely linked to the same
general entertainment purpose of the album and concert. This would indicate that
there was overlap in the two uses' purposes besides any discussion of religion.
Normally, that could undermine a finding of a different purpose under § 107(l).8
Scream Icon was street art, Green Day used street art in its album, and Staub used
street art in the video for the tour promoting that album: that sounds a lot like a
non-transformative entertainment duck, not one transmogrified into a religious
fowl.
Second, the "transformations" to the original work in Seltzer were meager. As
the Ninth Circuit noted, Scream Icon was clearly identifiable as it "dominated" the
center of the frame and was highly visible at the concert.82  That lack of
modifications is concerning when the purposes of the works are similar. In a
similar vein, the court also concluded that Green Day "never used [Scream Icon] to
market the concert, CDs, or merchandise," and so the use was only "incidentally
commercial."8 However, the image was apparently plastered behind the band (and
even behind the lead singer) in seventy-ish concerts promoting the street-art-linked
CD, and it was also played at the MTV Music Awards.84 Its purpose was, in part,
to entertain and decorate the background at a commercial venue; Scream Icon was
also made to entertain and decorate. Although Green Day's use was not as
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1176-77.
79. Id. at I174.
80. Id. at 1173-75.
81. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("[W]here the 'use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the copyright holder's] ... such use
seriously weakens a claimed fair use."') (quoting Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir.
1989)); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding second
use was not transformative where it served the same purpose as the original); see also Video Pipeline,
Inc., 342 F.3d at 200 ("shared character and purpose" between second and original uses tilted first factor
towards no fair use).
82. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1174.
83. Id at 1177.
84. Videos of the concerts depict this vividly. See, e.g., Check out My Playlists, Green Day -
East Jesus Nowhere Official Music Video, YouTUBE (Oct. 9, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=iPul8Wt8e7Y, grenadegoesboom, Green Day - East Jesus Nowhere... Billie Joe brings afan
onstage, YOUTUBE (July 27, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-QHwwJuzv0j0, Augusto
Bellini, Green Day East Jesus Nowhere Live in Munich Mtv World Stage, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Owuu-U5ArrM.
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commercial as, say, using the image on the CD itself, it seems worthy of more
weight than the Ninth Circuit put on the scales.85
Third, if simply using a work to talk about a different topic makes a work
transformative, as Seltzer held, the subfactor swallows other transformativeness
subcategories. For example, when one work uses content from a prior work to
parody the original, courts require that the parody comment on the original.86 It is
not enough that the work commented on something else-that is the often-
maligned area of satire, and it is generally further from the domain of fair use.87 If
a parody must comment on the original to be a protected parody, why can Scream
Icon be used to discuss anything that isn't in the original?
In other words, what value remains in the parody defense when Seltzer's less-
restrictive alternative is available? To qualify as transformative under Seltzer, there
would be no need for a parody to comment on the original so long as it commented
on anything the original did not address. That court was unconcerned about the
fact that the two works overlapped in other purposes-both Scream Icon and Green
Day's CD/concert served an entertainment function and addressed street art culture
and imagery-so it is not, under Seltzer, problematic in future fact patterns if the
two works have similar purposes. Seltzer does not resolve this quandary.
Seltzer's rule could similarly undermine the requirements in news reporting. For
example, in Nunez v. Caribbean International News Corp., a newspaper used an
allegedly scandalous photograph of Miss Puerto Rico Universe to discuss whether
the photograph was so racy as to be inappropriate for the holder of that title." The
court held that this was a fair use because the "the pictures were the story. It would
have been much more difficult to explain the controversy without reproducing the
photographs."8 9 "It [wa]s this transformation of the works into news-and not the
mere newsworthiness of the works themselves-that weigh[ed] in favor of fair use
under the first factor of § 107."90 Under Seltzer, it would not be required that a
news publication used the photograph as a topic of discussion about the images so
long as it used the image to talk about any new meaning other than what the image
contained. This would be the case as to the news reporting category more broadly,
not Nunez in particular. Thus, Seltzer's definition of transformativeness threatens
to override classic fair use doctrines.
But even if Seltzer is to pave the way for a category of transformative uses that
simply comment on some matter the original did not address, this use was not part
of a comment on the meaning of religion among graffiti artists or a debate about
whether popular street art had religious connotations (uses that would have a better
85. See Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178.
86. See, e.g., SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268 ("[Tjhe Supreme Court has required that we
ensure that 'a parodic character may reasonably be perceived' in the allegedly infringing work.")
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).
87. The role of satire in fair use is a topic of ongoing debate. A classic lightning rod in that
debate is Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
88. 235 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2000).
89. Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 23.
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claim to fair use of Scream Icon). This was a rock concert. While famous
musicians certainly can make transformative uses,9' it is hard to see why they
should be able to appropriate nearly an entire image unrelated to the original's
message and use it in a strongly commercial venue. This case looked less like true
transformation and more like "avoid[ing] the drudgery in working up something
fresh," which generally disfavors fair use under factor one.92  Thus, even under
Seltzer's own doctrine, it seems like a weak case for transformative use.
Irrespective of whether Seltzer is, normatively speaking, a wise
transformativeness category, it is also in tension with prior cases. In reaching its
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited a number of cases that exemplified, in its eyes,
"the typical 'non-transformative' case" and the typical transformative case.93 But
those same cases reveal the Ninth Circuit's deviation from a standard
transformativeness ruling.
Among those cases was Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., a
Second Circuit case which found not transformative the brief use in a cable sitcom
of a poster depicting a quilt.94 The poster was used as a decoration on the sitcom's
set and appeared multiple times, though briefly, in a broadcast of a particular
episode addressing a range of topics including gambling debts.95  The Second
Circuit concluded the poster was used "for precisely a central purpose for which it
was created-to be decorative"9 6 and, accordingly, "[i]n no sense [wa]s the
defendants' use transformative."97 That the quilt was used in an episode that added
new message and meaning (such as addressing gambling) did not change that
result. Yet, even though the screaming face in Seltzer had "a central purpose" of
being decorative street art, and it was used by Green Day to be decoration in an
entertainment-related event linked to street art, the fact that the video added a
religious critique was sufficient to render it transformative.98 Given these factual
similarities but divergent results, Seltzer was a step away from Ringgold.99
91. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (involving famous
musicians); Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Jan. 14,
2014) ("Society's interest in ensuring the creation of transformative works incidentally utilizing
copyrighted material is legitimate no matter who the defendant may be."), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2319
(2014).
92. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 ("If . .. the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or
style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses ... to avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes
accordingly (if it does not vanish) .... ).
93. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013).
94. 126 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1997).
95. Id at 72, 79.
96. Id
97. Id. at 78 (internal citation omitted).
98. Cf id. at 80 ("[P]roducers of plays, films, and television programs should generally expect to
pay a license fee when they conclude that a particular work of copyrighted art is an appropriate
component of the decoration of a set.").
99. Seltzer and Ringgold could be distinguished on a sort of "artistic merger" theory; work is
likely more transformative when it is merged into the original such that they take on a unified existence
(like in a collage) and less transformative when the work simply appears unaltered in the second use
(like a poster in the background of a TV episode). Although that theory would be consistent with some
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The same is true for Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video-another
case Seltzer cited-in which the Ninth Circuit considered whether using numerous
Elvis songs, photos, and video appearances as elements in a comprehensive Elvis
biography was a fair use.00 The court held that the infringing uses were not
transformative because, inter alia, they were "clearly commercial in nature" and
were "not consistently transformative" because some video clips were shown with
little or no interruption and thus "serve[d] the same intrinsic entertainment value"
as the original works.o'0 Other clips and uses in that case were transformative
because they were historical references.102
Seltzer's analysis is in tension with that result. Just as in Elvis Presley
Enterprises, at least some of the uses in Seltzer were "for the same intrinsic
entertainment value" as Scream icon, but the Seltzer court still found the work was
transformative.0 3 That does not parallel the Elvis case's holding that using works
in a biography that involved at least other partially transformative uses was not
enough to be transformative. The Elvis biography commented on topics that were
not in the originals, but that was not enough to render all the uses transformative.0 4
Why, then, was such commentary on a new topic sufficient in Seltzer? The two
cases are partially distinguishable in that Elvis Presley Enterprises was decided 'as
"a close issue" under an abuse of discretion standard, but the two cases are not in
harmony.'05
Seltzer does not fare much better among the cases it cited as positive examples
supporting its conclusion. For example, the court cited Bill Graham Archives v.
Dorling Kindersley Ltd., which involved Grateful Dead posters and tickets that
were reproduced in a biography to discuss the history of the band.106 The court
held that use was transformative.107 Though the posters and other images had an
overlapping purpose with the originals (both were, in part, made to entertain), they
were not random pop icons-they were images of the band used in a discussion
about that band's history.'0 8 Thus, the uses fell in the classic historical biography
and "commenting on" categories because the new work was commenting on the
originals and related matters.109 Green Day, however, neither commented on
Scream Icon itself nor was the image used in a biographical sense.1 'o Thus, this
prior cases, Scream Icon was largely unaltered in Seltzer and simply had additional images layered on
top of it, making that case a weak candidate under even a merger theory.
100. 349 F.3d 622, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds as stated in Flexible
Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2011).
101. Id. at 629.
102. Id.
103. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1177 (citing Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629
(9th Cir. 2003)).
104. Id.
105. Id at 629, 631.




110. Seltzer is also distinguishable in other important ways. For example, whereas the book
creators in Bill Graham Archives reduced the resolution of the images, Scream Icon was enlarged and
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case does not predict the result in Seltzer; instead, Seltzer was a deviation from
much of the prior case law the court cited addressing § 107(1).
Seltzer is also inconsistent with cases it did not cite. For example, in Dr. Seuss
Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., the court considered the book The Cat
NOT in the Hat!, which told the story of the O.J. Simpson trial using thematic
elements and style from Dr. Seuss's book The Cat in the Hat." 1 The Ninth Circuit
held that this use was not transformative because the second work was not a parody
of the original and "there [wa]s no effort to create a transformative work with 'new
expression, meaning, or message."' l
2
Under the Seltzer model, the attempted parody would have been transformative
because the original tale said nothing about murder, but the latter did-that is new
meaning and expression.113 The Ninth Circuit in Dr. Seuss Enterprises would not
have needed to say that "the critical issue under this factor is whether The Cat NOT
in the Hat! is a parody"' l4 because, even if not, it could be transformative in the
vein of Seltzer by adding a new message on a different topic. Nor would the
court's closing observation that "there [wa]s no effort to create a transformative
work with 'new expression, meaning, or message"'115 have been correct because,
just as in Seltzer, The Cat NOT in the Hat! used portions of the original (less than
was used in Seltzer) to tell a new story on a topic the original did not address. If
that was not transformative of The Cat in the Hat, it is hard to explain why fewer
changes, less copying, and an equally new topic were sufficient in Seltzer.
On Davis v. The Gap, Inc. presents similar difficulties. In that case, the plaintiff
made "sculptured metallic ornamental wearable art" in the form of eye jewelry,
which The Gap inadvertently used in a photo shoot for an ad."16 The court held the
use was not transformative because the jewelry was depicted "in the manner it was
made to be worn."1 17 However, under Seltzer it could have been transformative
because the ad also commented on new issues apparently not part of the eye
jewelry's message and expression: multi-cultural fashion and diversity topics.118
These cases uggest that Seltzer was an expansion of the transformative use
subfactor. Although the Seltzer court concluded in passing that Seltzer was "a
otherwise fairly unmodified. And whereas the book creators had tried to license the images, that was
not the case in Seltzer. Though there are similarities, such as that both works were commercial and both
works involved-to different extents-a collage approach, those differences do not explain Seltzer.
Ill. 109 F.3d 1394, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 1399-1401 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).
113. Cf id at 1394. See also Copyright Law - Fair Use - Second Circuit Holds That
Appropriation Artwork Need Not Comment on the Original to Be Transformative. - Cariou v. Prince,
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1228, 1234 n.62 (2014). This comment is not to be
taken as suggesting that The Cat NOT in the Hat was not transformative. The point made here is only
that even the Ninth Circuit should have found the work transformative if the test in Seltzer is the
applicable law.
114. Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P., 109 F.3d at 1400.
115. Id. at 1401 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).
116. On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
117. Id. at 174-75.
118. The opinion gives no indication that the original jewelry had a message related to multi-
cultural and diversity matters, but the example here is primarily illustrative in any event.
FAIR USE AND THE NEW TRANSFORMATIVE
close and difficult case,""9 the court's discussion of the transformativeness
subfactor did not reflect that belief. Omitted was any hand-wrenching.120 If Seltzer
truly was seen as a close case, depicting that in the analysis would have clarified
how subsequent courts should adjudicate similar cases. Without that clarification,
and in light of the problems identified in this section, Seltzer has muddied the
waters as to the state of § 107(1).
C. CARIOU
In the Seltzer court's eyes, however, it was largely building from the foundation
of an earlier case in the Second Circuit, Cariou v. Prince.121 Cariou is the case that
most galvanized the recent outcry against the transformativeness factor.122  In
Cariou, the Second Circuit considered appropriation artist Richard Prince's Canal
Zone work, which was based largely on photographs by Patrick Cariou.123 Cariou
published a series of classical portraits and landscape photographs of Rastafarians
in Jamaica. 124 Prince used those photographs to varying degrees in several images
that Prince later sold for large amounts.125 For example, Prince tore pictures out of
Cariou's original book and pinned them to plywood, significantly enlarged the
images, drew circle and oval shapes over some subjects' facial features, added
other images such as of nude women, and made additional changes such as
adjusting the coloration and assembling the works into collages.126 For some of his
finished creations, Prince made several changes to the original works, and
"Cariou's work [wals almost entirely obscured," 27 but in others Prince made
"vanishingly" few changes to Cariou's originals.128
Cariou sued Prince and associated entities; Prince raised a fair use defense; and
the district court rejected that defense.'29 In doing so, though, the district court
"impose[d] a requirement that the new work in some way comment on, relate to the
historical context of, or critically refer back to the original works" to qualify as fair
use-a requirement the court concluded Prince's works did not meet.130
119. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013).
120. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269 ("On the one hand, the story of Cynara and her
perception of the events in [The Wind Done Gone] certainly adds new 'expression, meaning, [and]
message' to [Gone with the Wind]. From another perspective, however, TWDG's success as a pure
work of fiction depends heavily on copyrighted elements appropriated from GWTW to carry its own
plot forward."). This quote, with "Scream Icon" and "Green Day's video" substituted in, could be
applied verbatim to Seltzer.
121. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1177 (citing Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013)).
122. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 1, at 829, 843 (noting this controversy).
123. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698.
124. Id; see also PATRICK CARIOU, YES RASTA (powerHouse Books 2000).
125. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699-700.
126. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd in part, vacated in part,
714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
127. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 700-01.
128. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
129. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 700-01.
130. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348-49; see also Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704 (quoting the district
court).
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The Second Circuit disagreed on appeal.131 First, the court rejected the district
court's aforementioned requirement, explaining that it was not a part of the first
factor in all cases.132 Instead, the new works needed only to add "new expression,
meaning, or message."1 33 The court then held that twenty-five of Prince's works
were transformative because-unlike Cariou's serene, composed, black-and-white
images-Prince's were crude and jarring, incorporated color, and were ten-to-one-
hundred times larger.134 In the other five works, however, Prince had made fewer
changes, and the court remanded them for further consideration of whether they
were transformative and fair use generally.135 That analysis never happened, as the
parties ultimately settled after the Supreme Court denied the petition for review.136
In some ways, Cariou is generally consistent with prior cases given the
significant level of modifications that Prince made to the twenty-five works.'37
However, Cariou is still notable for several reasons. First, the district court made
various observations that he Second Circuit did not fully address. The district
court had explained that it was "aware of no precedent holding that [using
copyrighted materials as 'raw ingredients' in the creation of new works [wa]s fair
absent transformative comment on the original."138  Though the Second Circuit
rejected that conclusion, it offered no case law to directly rebut it. Instead, it relied
on several cases that did not rest mainly (or even at all) on a transformed-content
rationale, including: Campbell (second work was purpose transformation as it
commented on the original via a parody), Blanch (purpose and content
transformation), Leibovitz (parody/purpose transformation), Harper & Row (news
reporting/purpose transformation), and Castle Rock Entertainment ("slight to non-
existent" transformativeness).139
Though the Cariou court was not breaking new ground in holding that copyright
law does not impose a "comment on or relate to the . . . original" requirement,140 it
did not directly confront the extent to which the court was charting new territory in
131. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706.
132. Id. Instead, it is traditionally an element of a parody case.
133. Id at 705-06 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
134. Id at 707.
135. Id. at 710-11.
136. Cariou v. Prince, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013); Randy Kennedy, Richard Prince Settles Copyright
Suit With Patrick Cariou Over Photographs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://
artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/richard-prince-settles-copyright-suit-with-patrick-cariou-over-
photographs/ [https://perma.cc/BQ9J-GWLD].
137. See generally Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding an appropriation artist's
work was transformative and fair use in part because of the modifications the appropriation artist made
to the original); see also Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(use of photographs in a movie set was transformative because they were used to help create "a distinct
visual aesthetic and overall mood" for the movie scene at issue), ajJ'd on other grounds, 147 F.3d 215
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding use was de minimis).
138. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
139. Castle Rock Entm't., Inc. v. Carol Publ'g. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998)
(intemal citation omitted).
140. See, e.g., Part 11, supra (discussion of the search engine cases, which generally did not involve
modifications to the originals' content).
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concluding Prince's works were content-transformative.141 This is especially so
given that the works included significant portions of the originals for the same
purpose as the originals (expression and entertainment). The Second Circuit
presumably cited no such cases because same-purpose-different-content is not the
traditional fair use arena outside the search engine/expression-ambivalent context
discussed previously.
Nor did the Second Circuit directly counter the district court's observation that
"[ilf an infringement of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use
solely on the basis of the infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use ...
there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense."l42 If adding any
new meaning is sufficient to make a work transformative, cases like Seltzer are a
natural progression of Cariou. And if new expression is sufficient even where the
purposes are otherwise identical, the crucial inquiry is, "how much is enough?"
Unfortunately, even though that issue was a core basis for the court remanding
five of the works, the Second Circuit did not articulate a standard for that analysis.
Cariou offers only the shadow of such a standard because the court did not actually
rule that the five were or were not transformative-it left that analysis to the district
court. Thus, Cariou highlights that new expression can render a work
transformative but provides minimal guidance on how much is enough.
Finally, part of Prince's self-described purpose in using another individual's
photographs was to "get as much fact into [his] work and reduce[] the amount of
speculation," which the district court interpreted as "using Cariou's Rastafarian
portraits [for] the same as Cariou's original purpose in taking them: a desire to
communicate to the viewer core truths about Rastafarians and their culture."l43 But
the Second Circuit relied on cases that generally involved a change in purpose.
Further, those changes were not just a change in the work's topic like the district
court thought Cariou's works were. Given that the Second Circuit's decision in
Cariou was entering new territory concerning the transformativeness subfactor,
these silences obscure subsequent understandings a to how this "new
transformative" functions.
Cariou is also notable for a second reason. In Prince's deposition, he had
explained that he "'do[es]n't really have a message,' that he was not 'trying to
create anything with a new meaning or a new message,' and that he do[es]n't have
any ... interest in [Cariou's] original intent."'144 This evidence could have been
viewed as relevant to whether Prince was using the original materials for a new
purpose and to create new meaning.145 The Second Circuit did not see itself as
141. See, e.g., Gilden & Greene, supra note 5, at 93 ("[T]he Second Circuit's opinion in Cariou
shifted the doctrine away from a rather long line of cases requiring the putative fair user to 'at least in
part' comment on the borrowed work itself.") (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569 (1994)).
142. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (quoting Rogers, 960 F.3d at 310).
143. Id. at 349 (quoting Richard Prince's Transcript at 44).
144. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting the district court and Prince's
deposition) (alterations in original).
145. See, e.g., Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83 (upholding the district court's conclusion that the work was
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limited to Prince's intended meaning, however; instead, it looked to "how the work
in question appears to the reasonable observer."146 In that discussion the Cariou
court also made the comment that paved the path for Seltzer:
The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in
order to be considered transformative, and a secondary work may constitute a fair use
even if it serves some purpose other than those (criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research) identified in the preamble to the statute.14'
Unfortunately, in addressing this topic, Cariou did not distinguish its own prior
case, Salinger v. Colting, which was relevant to how an artist's prior statements
affect the "purpose and character of the work" analysis.148 In Salinger, the district
court had concluded a purported commentary on The Catcher in the Rye and its
author was actually written for other reasons; the court reached that result by
looking to the artist's and his agent's statements about the purposes behind the
book.149 The Second Circuit found no clear error in that conclusion and affirmed
on appeal.150 If Cariou's "how the work might reasonably be perceived" standard
was the right approach, that is in tension with the fact that the court in Salinger did
not address whether the work at issue could reasonably be perceived as
commentary or critique independent of what the artist and agent intended. A
credibility analysis as to the author's asserted intent would be largely superfluous-
except perhaps from a bad faith angle-since the Cariou court's analysis allows
courts to bypass even an author's admissions of intents that weaken his or her §
107(1) case. Cariou leaves unilluminated the contours of disbelieved intentions
versus reasonable perceptions.
For these reasons and others, many commentators have concluded that Cariou
and Seltzer represent an expansion of the transformativeness subfactor of §
107(1).151 Though much of that criticism has focused on Cariou, Seltzer broke
more new ground. Further, the decision in Cariou, though not explained fully, at
least gestured at some boundary for its application: using too much of the original
work undermines a finding of transformativeness, and the five works remanded at
least offer some indicia of what "not enough" might look like.152 Further, as to
many of Prince's works that were not remanded, Cariou's originals were modified
almost to the point of not being identifiable, and Prince had added additional
elements including: painting a new background, adding shapes to subjects' faces,
not transformative based on defendant's and his agent's statements as to the purposes behind the work
under clear error standard). Cf Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-00684 JAK (RZx), 2013 WL 440127,
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) (faulting defendant for failing to explain why work was transformative).
146. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 706.
148. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
149. Id. at 83.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 1-6.
152. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710-11 ("Specifically, [five of Prince's works] do not sufficiently
differ from the photographs of Cariou's that they incorporate for us confidently to make a determination
about their transformative nature as a matter of law.").
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and adding the ever present graphic nudity in the Canal Zone series.5 3 One of the
stranger notes in Cariou, though, was the remand itself-if the key question was
how the works may reasonably be perceived, why was that a role the district court
was better suited to play as to those five images than as to the others the Second
Circuit "reasonably perceived" itselfI 54 In any event, Cariou's analysis has
already taken root in other courts.155
Further, if Cariou was an expansion of § 107(1), Seltzer was a step even further.
The changes to Scream Icon in Seltzer were closer in scope to the modifications in
the five images that the court in Cariou remanded than they were to the changes in
the twenty-five images that Cariou held were fair use.156  Thus, whereas the
Second Circuit adjusted the bar for transformativeness in Cariou under the "new
expression, meaning, or message" test, the Ninth Circuit in Seltzer removed the bar
nearly entirely by approving minimal changes in the context of substantially
overlapping (and commercial) purposes.
D. KIENITZ
In the wake of these decisions, and perhaps because of their expansive
interpretation of what qualifies as "transformative," that subfactor has come under
fire. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC illustrates one chapter of that revolt.'5 7 In
Kienitz, Sconnie Nation made shirts depicting a mayor's face and the text "Sorry
for Partying." 58  The text referenced the mayor's desire to shut down an annual
block party that, ironically, he had previously attended many years before.'59 The
image on the shirt was a posterized version of a photograph of the mayor that
Michael Kienitz took and gave to the mayor to use on the city's website.160 Kienitz
153. Cariou would have a weaker infringement claim as to many of those twenty-five works than
would the artists who took the photographs of the nude women, as the added women were a feature of
the works even more so than Cariou's images. Presumably no such claim would come to pass, however,
as Prince reported that he images of women were supplied from friends. Richard Prince: May 8-June
14, 2014, GAGOSIAN GALLERY, http://www.gagosian.com/exhibitions/richard-prince-may-08-2014
[https://perma.cc/C6JJ-RJXP] (last visited July 18, 2015).
154. See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713-14 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(making a similar observation).
155. See, e.g., TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, No. 15 CIV. 4325 (GBD), 2015 WL 9255341,
at *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2015) (use held transformative where it critiqued topics other than the
original and despite overlapping purposes-both original and second use were partly for comedic
purposes), appeal docketed, No. 16-134 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2016).
156. Compare supra note 84 (videos of the use in Seltzer) with Filing 91 Attachments 3-5, Cariou
v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. I-I l197-cv) (Joint Appendix docket entries howing most
of Prince's works at issue), https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/ll-l197/91/3.htmi
[https://perma.cc/US4A-6D7K], https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-1197/91 /
4.html [https://perma.cc/UH8F-AQ7Q], and https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/
1l-1 197/91/5.html [https://perma.cc/MG9V-HVBZ]. The five remanded images are titled Graduation,
Meditation, Canal Zone (2007), Canal Zone (2008), and Charlie Company. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710-
11.
157. 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015).
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sued, alleging copyright infringement, and Sconnie Nation defended on the grounds
of fair use.16 1
The trial court granted summary judgment to Sconnie Nation on the fair use
question, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal.162 In doing so, the appellate
court took several swipes at transformativeness and Cariou. First, the court
remarked that the transformativeness subfactor was "not one of the statutory
factors" in § 107 and characterized Cariou as a decision which overemphasized the
importance of transformativeness.16 3  The court then continued its lambast of
Cariou:
We're skeptical of Cariou's approach, because asking exclusively whether something
is "transformative" not only replaces the list in § 107 but also could override 17
U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works. To say that a new use transforms
the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected
under § 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do not explain how
every "transformative use" can be "fair use" without extinguishing the author's rights
under § 106(2).
We think it best to stick with the statutory list, of which the most important usually is
the fourth (market effect).164
The court then determined that the first factor was not of much help because,
though the shirts were created as political commentary, they were also created for
commercial ends.165 And although the court remarked that "[t]he fair-use privilege
under § 107 is not designed to protect lazy appropriators" and suggested these
defendants might be such,166 it concluded that the district court reached the right
conclusion-that the use was a fair use-because Sconnie Nation had used so little
of the original photograph after all the modifications were taken into account, and
there was no significant market harm.167
E. ASSESSING THE NEW TRANSFORMATIVE
As Kienitz illustrates, not all courts are on board with the new transformative
(and perhaps even the old transformative). Seltzer, and to a lesser extent Cariou,
represent an expansion of the § 107 transformativeness subfactor. Those results
are, however, offshoots of the Supreme Court's definition of "transformative" in
Campbell as encompassing subsequent works that involve "new expression,
meaning, or message."168  As noted previously, Campbell explained that "[t]he
central purpose of [the transformativeness inquiry] is to see . .. whether the new
161. Id. at 757-58.
162. Id. at 758-60. The trial court in this case was a magistrate judge serving by consent of the
parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
163. Id. at 758.
164. Id
165. Id. at 759.
166. Id.
167. Id at 758-60.
168. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994).
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work merely "supersede[s] the objects" of the original creation . .. or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message. . . ."169
To the extent that this test was intended to impose a new purpose requirement
for transformativeness, Campbell's language did not do so clearly. In that regard,
Seltzer and Cariou fall within Campbell's test as phrased because they embrace as
transformative merely new content or character. Unless "further purpose" is
defined to include simply a different message, the works in Seltzer and Cariou did
not have a "further purpose" beyond the purpose of the original (entertainment).
They were not parodies or news reports, for example. However, the works did
have a "different character," in that Green Day's video backdrop addressed religion
(whereas the original Scream Icon did not) and Prince's works had a jarring, post-
apocalyptic feel (whereas the Yes, Rasta works were serene). That led to the
secondary uses being deemed transformative despite the overlapping other
purposes, and the same has been true in other recent cases.'70
The new transformative of Cariou and Seltzer, though within the technical
phrasing of Campbell, is not consistent with the way courts have applied the
subfactor in the decades following Campbell's issuance. In other words, though
Campbell's phrasing permits this result, it was largely a dormant clause in the case
law. Now that it has been animated in various decisions, it is clear that Campbell
cast a very broad definition of transformativeness. Compounding the breadth is
that, under the "reasonably perceived" and undefined threshold for how much new
meaning is enough analyses, the predictability of the transformativeness factor has
diminished. 171
Cariou and Seltzer do not answer these questions. While the Second Circuit
recently required a secondary user "to show a justification" when "taking from
another author's work for the purpose of making points that have no bearing on the
original," 72 that standard applied with no rigor (if at all) in its prior decision in
Cariou. Further, defining what is a sufficient justification under that test brushes
against the general prohibition in fair use on artists using works simply to avoid the
drudgery of conjuring something fresh.173
169. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, No. 15 CIV. 4325 (GBD), 2015 WL 9255341,
at *Il (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2015) (explaining that use in play of "Who's on First" comedic routine was
transformative and caused first factor to weigh strongly in favor of the use because, inter alia, play used
the routine to illuminate the relationship between characters in the play).
171. Cf Olson, supra note 6, at 430-31 ("Certainly the longstanding criticism that
transformativeness lacks clear standards and is unpredictable has not been allayed-and the decisions in
Cariou and Seltzer only add to the confusion.").
172. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL
1551263 (Apr. 18, 2016).
173. Cf TCA Television Corp., 2015 WL 9255341 at *11-12. In this case, a boy used a sock
puppet to perform the "Who's on First" routine for a female romantic interest, Jessica; when Jessica
asked if the boy came up with the routine, he answered yes but the sock puppet revealed that he boy did
not and mocked Jessica for not knowing better. Id at * 10-11. The court argued that using the well-
known routine was "require[d so] that the audience [could] recognize the original source" of the routine.
Id. at *1l. This was transformative instead of "an attempt to. .. 'avoid the drudgery in working up
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This is the state of the new transformative. Kienitz's skepticism about other
approaches to transformative-which is not surprising against this backdrop-
gives rise to the specter of a circuit split, and one in an era of increased influence of
transformativeness under § 107.174 It is debatable as a normative matter, however,
whether this expansion is desirable. Given the inconsistency in the case law that
Seltzer and Cariou created, this Article proceeds on the argument that they are the
aberrations, not all of the cases with which they are in tension. Accordingly, Part
III considers ways to correct course for the transformativeness hip.
III. A MODEL FOR TRANSFORMATIVE
Parties on both sides of the fair use debate should agree that amorphous
boundaries and unpredictability are problematic. Although the case-by-case nature
of fair use makes it a flexible doctrine, malleability is the enemy of predictability
and is made worse when the rules of the case-by-case analysis are unclear. Rights
holders do not know what is permitted among secondary users, and secondary
users' artistic expression may be chilled by the unknown parameters of fair use.
Given the largely toothless nature of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's
misrepresentation provision, rights holders can respond to this uncertainty with a
rain of takedown notices.175  This chills and outright prevents some expressive
content. And under an amorphous fair use regime, all parties are less able to
predict the likelihood of success in a copyright action and the associated costs.
These shared concerns point towards the desirability for reform.
The solution, however, is harder to identify. In response to these issues, this
Part considers several interpretive approaches under § 107(1). Given that the
transformativeness inquiry is central to the fair use analysis, the revisions
ultimately proposed are grounded in "[t]he ultimate test of fair use . . . [which] is
whether the copyright law's goal of promoting the Progress of Science and useful
Arts would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it."l 76
something fresh."' Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
However, this use could also be seen as avoiding working up something fresh and capitalizing on the
well-known routine. For example, the play could have used an original joke introduced earlier in the
play and that Jessica had heard but simply forgot. The audience would connect with the joke (perhaps
even more so since some audience members will not be familiar with Who's on First?). This level of
micromanagement of art would likely have a chilling effect, but those same concerns could push courts
to find artistic convenience a sufficient justification and thereby trivialize the Second Circuit's
"justification" requirement.
174. See, e.g., Bunker & Calvert, supra note 1, at 97 ("Although some authority exists for the
fourth factor being the most important, it has since been overshadowed by the transformative-use
doctrine . . . .") (internal citations omitted).
175. See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Assoc. of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)
(imposing a subjective bad faith standard for DMCA bad faith claims); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,
No. 5:07-CV-03783-JF, 2013 WL 271673, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (same), appeal granted (9th
Cir. May 30, 2013); Takedown Hall of Shame, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://
www.eff.org/takedowns [https://perma.cc/66MG-DJGK] (last visited July 23, 2015) (noting examples of
frivolous takedown notices).
176. Bill Graham Archives v. Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Castle
Rock Entm't., Inc. v. Carol Publ'g. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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A. A FORK IN THE ROAD
Professor Rebecca Tushnet's description of purpose transformation and content
transformation is one helpful way to frame this discussion.177 As she explained,
"[t]ransformative purpose, in general, seems to mean that a defendant has a
different interpretive or communicative project than the plaintiff did in creating the
original work."' 78 Content transformation, on the other hand, pertains to using
components of an original in an altered form to create new meaning, such as
Prince's work in the twenty-five images held fair use in Cariou.179
Purpose transformations that fall in a preamble category-such as news
reporting, historical reference, and parodying an original, etc.-are classic fair use
and are often accepted by courts post-Campbell.iso Similarly, purpose
transformations that are expression-neutral, such as using originals in a database to
help find works or detect plagiarism, are also often found not to threaten the central
market of a work or its derivative markets.'8 ' Thus, in terms of changes in purpose,
the state of fair use is fairly clear in the courts: such works are transformative.
Unsurprisingly, then, works that change both purpose and content are similarly
seen as transformative.182
The greater difficulties have arisen for content-transformation cases."' Cariou
and Seltzer, as two such cases, are natural seeds of doctrinal divide. The central
question in content transformation cases is simple: How much is enough? How
much must the second artist change about the original, and how much new meaning
is needed? Related questions quickly multiply: What types of meaning are
different enough to count as new? And from whose perspective do courts evaluate
whether there is new meaning? The transformative-purpose cases present fewer
lines to draw, and courts can also look to the preamble of § 107 for examples as to
the types of purposes that Congress favored-there is no similar listing of
exemplary content transformation. Thus, the Article first confronts a fork in the
road for fair use: Should courts take the path to the right and continue to protect
content transformation, or should they veer left and jettison that doctrine and its
undrawn lines? 84
Though it is tempting to conclude that content transformation is simply not
worth the trouble, this is the lesser path from the perspective of copyright law's
goal of promoting the arts. Some uses that consist only of content transformation
would clearly be fair use and are of value to the progress of science and the useful
177. See generally Tushnet, supra note 2, at 878.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 881.
180. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (parody); Brownmark
Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012) (parody); Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News
Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000) (news reporting).
181. See, e.g., supra Part II.
182. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2006).
183. But see Tushnet, supra note 2, at 887 ("Indeed, to the extent that fair use's critics like fair use
at all, it is for content-transformativeness: uses that create new creative works.").
184. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
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arts. For example, we can imagine appropriation art that was non-commercial, that
used only modified portions of a published original, that used fairly little of the
original, and that did not harm the market for the original. 8 5 Appropriation art, as
a genre, is also valued by many in the art community, and declaring all such art
non-transformative would harm the progress of the arts as to those segments.'8 6
Discarding a whole category of expression to reduce uncertainty makes little sense
if the reason less uncertainty is desirable is to promote expression.
There can be no doubt that content-transformation cases and copyright law
collide at times.18 7  As another commentator has phrased it, "if the goal of
copyright is to promote the arts, then when art and law collide, it should be the law
that yields."'8 8  Though this has more rhetorical force than categorical
application-for example, imagine if pirated first editions or peer-to-peer networks
were valued widely as art-it is grounded in a keen observation: to promote the
arts requires some recognition of which arts the art world values. Appropriation art
is one such area. Courts should not reject content transformation simply because of
its interpretive challenges. Although the purpose of copyright law supports this
conclusion, ultimately retaining or rejecting content transformation as favoring fair
use is a normative question on which there is reasonable disagreement.
B. RIGHT PATH: RETAIN CONTENT TRANSFORMATION
Courts should, however, modify their approach to content transformation given
those challenges. This section proposes such alterations.
First, courts should recognize that, even though content transformation is
protected by fair use, it is an area that will often have a more difficult path to reach
fair use than purpose transformation. For example, the preamble to § 107 lists
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research as example
fair use categories.'89 Those areas may not be treated as "presumptively fair uses,"
and the list of examples was not meant to be exhaustive.190 However, many courts
recognize the general concept of looking to the preamble in determining which
"purpose[s] and character[s]" tip factor one towards fair use.191 The Supreme
Court said as much expressly: "The enquiry [under factor one] may be guided by
185. Cf § 107(1)-(4).
186. See generally Schaumann, supra note 36 (arguing, inter alia, that "[a]ppropriation art is a
legitimate and long-standing art form practiced by many twentieth- and twenty-first century artists").
187. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714
F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch, 467 F.3d 244.
188. Caroline L. McEneaney, Transformative Use and Comment on the Original: Threats to
Appropriation in Contemporary Visual Art, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 1521, 1551 (2013).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
190. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581, 584 (1994) ("Congress resisted
attempts to narrow the ambit of this traditional enquiry by adopting categories of presumptively fair use,
and it urged courts to preserve the breadth of their traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant
evidence."); accord Harper & Row Pub., Inc., 471 U.S. at 561 (news reporting is not a presumptively
fair use); PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 20, at 86.
191. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79; Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the examples given in the preamble to § 107, looking to whether the use is for
criticism, or comment, or news reporting, and the like."I 92 Similarly, courts should
note that the preamble's examples are not merely different subject matter; they are
different approaches to and contexts for expressive and factual works-they are
different purposes.
The preamble does not list as examples changes in message. In offering
examples of broad categories of uses like research and news reporting, it does not
indicate that simply changing the topic of the use from pertaining to astronomy to
pertaining to fishing is enough to make the use a new "purpose and character."
Some courts have already recognized that identical purposes are problematic even
when the artist makes some modifications or adds some new expression, and that is
in part because changing topic (i.e. potential content transformation) is not the
same as changing purpose.'93 This suggests that content transformation is a more
limited fair use realm.
For example, under this topic-based approach, Seltzer would have come out
differently. Scream icon was likely made for decorative, general expressive, and
general entertainment purposes. The use of that work in Green Day's concert was
probably for decorative and general entertainment purposes a  well, and thus it was
not a purpose-transformation case. And it involved few modifications to the
original, making it a weak content-transformation case. Thus, under this model, the
court would have concluded that he secondary use was not for a new purpose-it
was for a new topic (religion) within the same purpose (entertainment and
expression)-and thus was not purpose transformation. Similarly, there were too
few modifications to the original to qualify as content transformation. If simply
commenting on something the original did not address is sufficient under § 107, the
limits described in other cases would be largely superfluous, as discussed in Part II.
Ironically, the historically favored parody defense would then be harder to meet
than the content transformation model in Seltzer.
For these reasons, absent some other relevant trait under § 107(1)-like a
change in purpose-courts should not treat as transformative commenting on and
criticizing topics unrelated to the original work unless the original has been
significantly modified. However, because content transformation still has value in
promoting the arts, courts should continue to protect content transformations (like
in Cariou generally) but not read the category as so broad as to encompass minimal
modifications with overlapping central purposes (like in Seltzer). And of course,
even when content transformation works are not transformative, they may still be
fair use when enough other factors favor that result (including the commercial
inquiry under factor one).
If courts are to retain content transformation, guidance is needed on how much
modification is sufficient to create a new work. While it might not be possible to
draw the line precisely for content-only transformation-and a bright-line rule is
192. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
193. See, e.g., Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Worldwide Church
of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000).
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likely not permissible under Campbell'94-some general principles are apparent.
First, courts should reiterate that transformativeness is not a binary concept: works
can be almost transformative, slightly transformative, heavily transformative, and
on across the gamut. The same is true for content transformation. Courts weighing
a work's transformativeness in the § 107 inquiry should use a spectrum approach.
If a work made few changes to the original but made enough to deem the work
transformative, the other § 107 factors could more easily outweigh
transformativeness. By reiterating this spectrum, even when a court concludes a
work is transformative, it can better balance the weight of transformativeness
against other factors by acknowledging that transformativeness comes in many
sizes.
Similarly, the goal of copyright in this area-allowing others to build on prior
artists' works19 5-is not an all-or-nothing proposition. This goal is epitomized by
the transformativeness inquiry into whether "the secondary use adds value to the
original-if [copyrightable expression in the original work] is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings."19 6 Like other aspects of transformativeness, courts should view
"raw material" claims across a spectrum. Although the fair use doctrine is intended
to empower artists to build on the generations of art before them (especially in light
of our lengthy copyright terms), there is a range in the extent to which an artist may
use prior works as raw material. Works should not be deemed automatically
transformative simply because they use, in some sense of the word, another work as
"raw material." For example, using a work like a child uses individual Legos to
build a replica of downtown is not akin to putting, unmodified, a chair on a
lawnmower and calling it a John Deere. Instead, courts should also look to how the
material is used and whether the end result meets the other requirements of
transformativeness.
This is essentially the balance that Cariou, to the Second Circuit's credit,
adopted by remanding the five works that used Cariou's images in large swaths and
finding transformative the twenty-five works that more or less used only obscured
pieces of Cariou's photographs. If subsequent courts follow Cariou and Seltzer and
find transformative a content-transformation use that serves the same purpose as
the original, the extent-of-modifications or Legos vs. lawnmowers line is the last
line of defense containing the transformativeness subfactor. Where the original
work is copied in whole or substantial part, courts should adjust the other factors
accordingly. In such a case, the third factor should be at its apex even when new
meaning is added because content transformation does not "need" to use the
originals in the same way that many purpose transformations do. Courts should not
be in the business of micromanaging artistic decisions, but that truism does not
194. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85 (eschewing "rigid, bright-line" rules).
195. See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended
(Jan. 14, 2014) ("Absent any protection for fair use, subsequent writers and artists would be unable to
build and expand upon original works, frustrating the very aims of copyright policy.") (citing Campbell,
510 U.S. at 575-76).
196. Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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mean that all artists have carte blanche in the name of fair use.9 7
For example: if an artist seeks to address religious hypocrisy and to include a
screaming face in the final product to symbolize anguish on the topic, the artist
does not need to use Scream Icon to accomplish that to the same extent that Weird
Al parodying Michael Jackson's "Bad" needs to use elements of "Bad." 98 Though
reasonable minds can debate how much of "Bad" the parody needs-does it need
the same subway venue, the steam grate, the dance moves, etc.-its use of any of
them is a greater degree of necessity than the choice the artist seeking to use
Scream Icon made. Nor does an artist wishing to depict a futuristic, post-
apocalyptic world need to use Patrick Cariou's images of Rastafarians-again, at
least not in the same way that a news report on whether a given photo is scandalous
needs to use that photo. Many other images of screaming faces or Rastafarians will
do-most importantly, images the artist can create him or herself.'9 9
That is not to say that artists do not feel deep connections to images or that they
should be forced to settle for "inferior substitutes."200 Nor should they have to try
to obtain permission from others before appropriating work as raw material. But
there is a difference in the degree of necessity at issue, and that should affect the
latitude otherwise given under factor three to uses of large amounts of the
original(s).
Seltzer again is instructive. There, the court concluded that Scream Icon "[wa]s
not meaningfully divisible. Given that fact, this court has acknowledged that [the
third] factor will not weigh against an alleged infringer, even when he copies the
whole work, if he takes no more than is necessary for his intended use."20' This
requirement makes sense when the original is the only work that will do for that
purpose-a parody needs the parody target and a historical report on a document
might need the document. Scream Icon, to return to Seltzer, was eminently
divisible-Green Day's video could have used only the eyes or only the mouth or
half of the face, etc. The artist would not necessarily have to use a different image,
but requiring the artist to use less than the whole image to win the third factor is a
reasonable requirement when there is no parody-level-need for its use to begin
197. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 802 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003).
("[Plaintiff] strongly argues that [defendant] ... could have made his statements ... without using [the
copyrighted works at issue]. Acceptance of this argument would severely and unacceptably limit the
definition of parody. We do not make judgments about what objects an artist should choose for their
art.").
198. See, e.g., Adjmi v. DLT Entm't Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("Applying [the
third factor] to parody is particularly difficult because of a simple reality: a parody's humor is entirely
contingent on recognizable allusion to the original work."), appeal withdrawn, No. 15-1477 (2d Cir.
June 25, 2015). This example is simply illustrative as Weird Al generally has permission for his
parodies. See, e.g., Weird Al Frequently Asked Questions, Questions Related to Specific Albums #6,
http://www.al-oholicsanonymous.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/H2CT-TUDQ] (last visited July 22, 2015).
199. Cf Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759 ("There's no good reason why defendants should be allowed to
appropriate someone lse's copyrighted efforts as the starting point in their lampoon, when so many
noncopyrighted alternatives (including snapshots they could have taken themselves) were available.
The fair-use privilege under § 107 is not designed to protect lazy appropriators.").
200. COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION, supra note 9, at 9.
201. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013).
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with. The artist might not desire to use less, but that does not mean the third factor
should pack it up and sit this one out.
How, though, are courts to draw this line given that artists will desire to use-
and may feel a deep need to use-a particular screaming face or Rastafarian
photographs? Courts give search engines wider latitude under the third factor to
copy entire originals202 even though the database could accomplish its goal fairly
well by using less than all the text in a book-users could still find lots of books, or
find all the books with those words in the books' introductions. Why, then, push an
artist to compromise his or her vision by giving the artist less latitude in that same
factor? If "close enough" is not what fair use forces on search engines, why
otherwise for appropriation art?
The answer is that courts should not view the third factor as a "use only the
minimum" requirement. Nor should courts be in the business of telling artists to
choose a different image. But the fair use doctrine historically puts courts directly
in the business of weighing the fact that the artist used the entire original work and
balancing that fact accordingly. Section 107(3) and the precedent which the statute
enshrined instruct courts that the amount of the original used is relevant to fair use.
Where there is a decline in degree of need in content-transformation cases, full and
close-to-full use of an original should push factor three towards disfavoring fair
use. That does not mean that the second user will fail in a fair use defense, but the
difference in degree of necessity calls for a difference in analysis under § 107(3).
To do otherwise limits the extent to which fair use encourages copying less than the
entire work when appropriate.
C. MULTIPLE PURPOSES
Works will often have multiple purposes.203 Artists create works for a variety of
reasons, and so too the purposes and characters of works are often multifaceted.
For the same reasons that courts consider whether there is a change in purpose and
character generally-it reveals whether a sufficiently new work has been created,
and it shapes how much the secondary use will supersede the original-courts
should consider the various reasons the work was made. That does not always
happen, however.
For example, in Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, the district
court considered whether an unauthorized guidebook to the Harry Potter universe
was a fair use.204 The court held that "[p]resumably" the author of the Harry Potter
202. See, e.g., HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 98 ("Because it was reasonably necessary ... to make use
of the entirety of the works in order to enable the full-text search function, we do not believe the copying
was excessive.").
203. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608-09 (2d Cir. 2006)
("Originally, each of [the] images [at issue] fulfilled the dual purposes of artistic expression and
promotion."); Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Appellee
reprinted the pictures not just to entice the buying public, but to place its news articles in context . . .
204. Warner Bros. Entrn't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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books wrote them for an expressive, entertainment-related purpose.205 The court
found that the guidebook, however, was created "for the practical purpose of
making information about the intricate world of Harry Potter readily accessible to
readers."206 That conclusion gave insufficient weight to the fact that the guidebook
was also created to entertain, among perhaps other reasons.207 In weighing the
transformativeness inquiry, courts should analyze the work's primary purpose but
also identify and compare the extent to which additional purposes overlap with the
original use's purposes. Greater overlap should weigh against fair use while lesser
overlap should weigh in favor of fair use. Not reviewing the multifaceted reasons
for which works are made ignores the extent to which two uses do or do not have
distinct "purpose[s] and character[s]" under § 107(1).208 Forcing a work into only a
primary category ignores the reality and nuance of the work's actual goals.
That a new work's additional purpose(s) overlaps with the original work's
purpose(s) does not mean that the new work is not transformative. Instead, if both
works had something of an entertainment purpose (for example), that would
diminish the second work's claim to transformativeness. But that does not mean
the work fails factor one: in many cases, like Campbell, the primary purpose
(parody) will be so prominent that it will trump any overlap, and the use will still
be transformative. Recognizing additional purposes does not foreclose fair use, but
it does better reflect the nuanced reality of why works are made. And where works
truly do have only one primary purpose that differs from the original work's
purpose, that should strongly support a finding of transformativeness.
D. INTERPRETING PURPOSE: WHICH PERSPECTIVE MATTERS?
An additional issue under § 107(1) that Cariou highlighted is the issue of how
courts should decipher the purpose of the initial and secondary uses. Should the
court look to the author's intended purpose, to what a reasonable observer might
think is the purpose, to surveys or other evidence of what actual observers have
concluded was the purpose, to what art critics think is the purpose, or to some
combination of the above?
As discussed in Part 11, courts have adopted a range of positions on this
question.209 Commentators have also proposed a variety of approaches to
determining the relevant vantage point for adjudicating the works' purposes. Some
205. Id. at 541.
206. Id. at 541, 543.
207. For example, the long entries that contained few-to-no citations to where the material
described was from-an omission that greatly diminishes the book's value as a reference tool-suggest
the book also sought to be an enjoyable read. See id. at 544. Similarly, that the guidebook contained
jokes also suggests it was intended to have, however slight, an entertainment purpose. See, e.g., id. at
543. The at times heavy use of the original author's "colorful literary device[s and] distinctive
description[s]" supports this argument as well. Id. at 547.
The court did, however, note that author J.K. Rowling's companion books had multiple purposes. Id.
at 541-42 (noting they had reference and entertainment goals).
208. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
209. See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
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tests focus on the reader response, others look to author's intent, while still others
call for a balancing of the available viewpoints.210  Among the advocates for an
audience's-perspective-based analysis, there is also debate over whether the
audience should be a lay audience, an audience of art experts, the actual target
audience for the work, or somewhere in between.211 There are many such
approaches judges could take, and copyright law offers no shortage of parallels to
draw from: judges make a variety of interpretive decisions throughout copyright
litigation.212
For example, Laura Heymann has argued that "the better test . .. is to turn to the
reader. . . [because doing so] determine[s] whether the defendant's use promotes
the delivery of new works to the public, the ultimate goal of copyright . . . ."213
Similarly, Walker and Depoorter argue that courts should look to hypothetical
viewers in "the general community from which the works in question hail" and
ascribe to those viewers "aesthetic insights that are appropriate to the interpretative
questions at issue."214  Another alternative would be for judges to look to the
perspectives of experts trained in art criticism via expert testimony.215 Still others
would focus on "all viewpoints reasonably available to the reviewing court"2 16 or
on an assembly of factors that include the artist's intent and expert testimony from
art critics and historians.217 Arguably, considering a range of interpretations might
potentially push the court's perception "toward the center of the viewpoint
spectrum" and thereby minimize outliers likely to be present given the wide range
of possible interpretations for art. 2 18 This might also make the fair use analysis
more predictable, given that it would be grounded in mainstream views.219 Finally,
commentators have advocated that, at a minimum, the reasonable perception test at
210. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 449 (2008); Michael W. Tyszko, Whose Expression Is It, Anyway? Why
"New Expression, Meaning, or Message"- Should Consider All Reasonably Available Viewpoints, 65
SYRACUSE L. REV. 221, 223 (2014).
211. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 890 (target audience approach); Robert Kirk Walker &
Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright Law: A Community of Practice
Standard, 109 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 349 (2015) (standard based on the "person having ordinary skill in
the art" standard from patent law).
212. See generally Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469
(2015) (describing interpretive decisions judges make in numerous contexts ranging from the
"substantial similarity" stages to fair use determinations); Walker & Depoorter, supra note 211, at 358-
71 (summarizing different "interpretative devices" in different parts of copyright analysis).
213. Heymann, supra note 210, at 448-49 (footnotes omitted). Heymann would consider evidence
that there are "distinct discursive communities . . . surrounding each copy" as indicating that "the
meaning of the expression has been transformed, even if the expression itself has not." Id at 455.
214. Walker & Depoorter, supra note 211, at 376.
215. See, e.g., Monika Isia Jasiewicz, "A Dangerous Undertaking": The Problem of
Intentionalism and Promise of Expert Testimony in Appropriation Art Infringement Cases, 26 YALE J.L.
&IHUMAN. 143, 171 (2014).
216. Tyszko, supra note 210, at 223.
217. See, e.g., McEneaney, supra note 188, at 1547 (2013) (considering these factors along with
"the objective difference between the two works").
218. Tyszko, supra note 210, at 241-42.
219. Tyszko, supra note 210, at 242.
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play in parts of Cariou and Seltzer should be better defined to clarify how to apply
it in the future.220
How an "ordinary person" might reasonably perceive the work is the best
analytical angle for several reasons. If the first factor is to mirror and advance the
goal of copyright of "promot[ing] ... the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts,"221 it will best accomplish that by reference to the ordinary person.222 That is,
after all, who would most frequently benefit from copyrighted works. Artistic
"progress," in the sense of the Constitution's grant of power, is not something that
happens in the ether; it happens with real people in the real world. Focusing on
what an ordinary person would perceive grounds the analysis in the body of people
that copyright law was meant o protect.
Evidence from the other categories of potential audiences could assist this
analysis. For instance, evidence of what actual observers perceive to be the
purpose of each work can be valuable in the same way that evidence of actual
confusion can be helpful in proving likelihood of confusion under trademark law-
though not all courts are receptive to either idea.223 Like in trademark law, the data
will be only as helpful as it is accurate and representative; biased survey questions
or a small sample size would undermine the evidence's value.224  If a court
considers survey or other direct evidence of what a group of people actually
perceived in the work, it is critical that the data reflect a large, representative
sample. When the sample is of an appropriate size, this data has natural appeal:
credible evidence that individuals actually did perceive a different purpose is strong
evidence that such a purpose could reasonably be perceived.
The reasonable observer standard is also preferable to courts looking to an art
expert's perspective alone, because that route could lead to a chilling effect in the
name of art elitism. The average artist, especially an artist not classically trained in
art history and technique, could only guess what the "expert" might say about his or
her work's purpose. However, everyone has a fair chance of deciphering what the
"ordinary person" might think. In as much as prediction is possible from any
theoretical perspective, the ordinary person is easiest o gauge.
However, looking simply to the vast depths of how art might "reasonably be
220. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 6, at 431.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
222. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); SOFA Entm't,
Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 2013) ("The Copyright Act exists to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA
Entm't, Inc., 705 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013).
223. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to
consider plaintiff's survey purporting to show a work was not a parody by reference to individuals in the
general public thought was the work's purpose); id. ("Allowing majorities to determine whether a work
is a parody would be greatly at odds with the purpose of the fair use exception and the Copyright Act.").
224. If evidence of actual perception is valuable, why not make it required in place of a reasonable
observer standard? In short because it will not always be available and, when it is, it will often be
expensive, which will foreclose it as an option for many litigants. An ordinary person standard is thus a
better fit, though it can be informed by survey data when the sample is representative.
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perceived"225 is still too unpredictable because art can mean many things to as
many people.226 It is a task that, to most people (and most judges), invites wild
speculation and, as a result, brushes against the Supreme Court's warning that "[i]t
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits." 227  And even if trained discernment was
attempted, judges do not always have such training and might not recognize the
complexity of interpreting some expressive works.228 An unanchored analysis of
"reasonable perception" is therefore problematic.
There is also a troublesome interaction between an unanchored "how [the]
works may reasonably be perceived" test2 29 and content transformation. If any new
topic or meaning will suffice as content transformation, and the topic and meaning
are to be interpreted in whatever ways a reasonable person might see the work, the
test compounds in expansiveness. For example, in Gaylord v. United States, the
United States Postal Service issued a stamp depicting sculptures of soldiers in the
Korean War Memorial.230 The sculptor sued, and the Federal Circuit held the
stamp's use was not transformative.231 However, the stamp depicted the soldier
sculptures covered in snow (thus not depicting all of the works) and in subdued
lighting, while the original sculptures did not involve snow.232 Thus, the stamp had
some modifications to the original work. A reasonable observer free to cast about
in the depths of interpretation could perceive many new meanings in such a work
as well: that the Korean War buried the United States in chilled conditions;
commentary about Korean War and Cold War connections; a commentary tied to
21st century wars in desert climates; etc. These are levels of "new meaning," but
how is a plaintiff or defendant expected to anticipate all of them? The stamp in
Gaylord was held not transformative, but how would the court sort through these
approaches without some anchor for the analysis?233
Tethering the reasonable observer test to the artist's intent would make this
analysis more manageable and predictable. In essence, it is the difference between
guessing what all possible interpretations might be (i.e. how a work might
225. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).
226. See, e.g., Liz McKenzie, Drawing Lines: Addressing Cognitive Bias in Art Appropriation
Cases, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 95-103 (2013) (collecting sources and arguing that there is a strong
risk that judges will succumb to cognitive bias in cases involving interpreting appropriation art).
227. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Cf Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582-83 (1994) (citing Bleistein and applying it in the context of
parody).
228. See, e.g., Said, supra note 212, at 506 ("Judges lack clear guidance on what to do when
confronted with expressive or artistic works, because at present there is little awareness of the
interpretive complexity inherent in these works."); see generally Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand
Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REv. 683 (2012) (addressing copyright and visual
works).
229. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
230. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1370.
231. Id. at 1373.
232. Id. at 1369-73.
233. Id. at 1373.
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reasonably be perceived generally) and determining whether the artist's intent
could be reasonably perceived. The largely unrestrained inquiry into how a work
might reasonably be perceived invites judges to invent purposes the artist never
had, and use the transformativeness subfactor as a proxy for their own biases.234 it
pushes "transformative" towards being "all things to all people" and a vacuous
concept.235 Limiting the inquiry to whether an ordinary person would perceive the
purpose the artist actually intended grounds this analysis in the tangible and
reduces the risk of bias.236  It also parallels the analysis the Court undertook in
Campbell: there, the justices looked to whether the authors' asserted intent (that
the work was a parody) "may reasonably be perceived."237
This approach also reduces the unpredictability of this factor. Ideally, a plaintiff
seeking to bring or appeal a copyright claim should be able to assess the likely
outcome. So too should many others connected with art, such as galleries and art
promoters. Otherwise, the parties cannot properly evaluate the risks of the art,
litigation, alternative paths, settlement, and the various associated transaction costs.
By grounding the analysis in the artist's intent and reasonable perception thereof,
the parties can better analyze and proceed.
Finally, this approach also supports the general concept that artists who act in
good faith should be less susceptible to copyright claims than artists who act in bad
faith. Although permission is not required for a finding of fair use and acting in
bad faith does not necessarily undermine fair use, courts tend to look more
favorably upon artists who act in good faith.238 Basing the content
transformativeness analysis on what the artist intended complements that
assessment because it will reward artists who intend, and succeed, at creating
works that have a different character than the original. This is a useful incidental
benefit to an author-intent linked approach. It does not solve this problem entirely,
but it at least requires the artist to have (or in a more cynical vein, convince the
judge he or she had) good faith. This approach also preserves breathing room for
good faith attempts that are not fully realized. If an artist sets out to create
something with a different purpose and meaning but he or she does not completely
succeed, the work may be saved because it can still "reasonably be perceived" as
234. Cf Olson, supra note 6, at 431 ("A court's substitution of its own artistic judgment over that
of the artist or expert witnesses with regard to the expressive purpose of a secondary work does nothing
to clarify the transformative use doctrine and injects further uncertainty into the practice of any type of
creative activity that requires significant borrowing of material.").
235. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][I][b] (quoting Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented
Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1525, 1670 (2004)).
236. Not all artists will make comments regarding their intent. In many cases, however, they will.
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting artist's
website statement hat described his intent in creating certain works); Jonathan McIntosh, Buffy vs
Edward: Twilight Remixed, YOUTUBE (June 19, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=RZwM3GvaTRM (including, in the video description, a statement of intent and link to further
discussion of his intent).
237. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994); see also id at 582-83.
238. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1173 n.6; Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l
News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Ltd. P'ship, 737 F.3d 932
(4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Jan. 14, 2014).
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having the purpose and meaning intended.
In summary, courts should adopt a hybrid approach to analyzing content
transformation uses through a three step analysis. First, the person claiming fair
use (or his or her attorney) should point to the intended purpose of the use. Second,
the court should consider whether an ordinary person would reasonably perceive
that intended purpose by viewing the art in the primary context in which it was
presented. Finally, the court should determine whether that purpose was
transformative. If so, the use is transformative under the first factor.
There are, however, costs to this model. For example, what if an artist does not
express any intent in creating the work or, though he or she had intent, refuses to
voice it for the court?239 Similarly, what about where an artist has no particular
intent except to create art generally, or perhaps created the work for general
amusement, to hone his or her skills, or simply for general expression related
purposes?
Those intentions often will not exist alone-although the artist might be creating
art just to practice, he or she chose to practice in a particular way for some reason,
and that reason is a secondary purpose that might be transformative under purpose
or content transformation. For example, a secondary purpose might be to add new
meaning to a prior work, and that second purpose could then qualify as content
transformation if reasonably perceived. Or it could be parody under purpose
transformation. And if the artist is not trying to sell the work, it might even win the
first factor on the grounds that it is simply noncommercial practice. Thus, by
recalling the spectrum of purposes, artists practicing are still protected. This model
is not perfect, but it is superior to casting about in the depths of the mind of an
unmoored reasonable observer.
E. FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE NEW TRANSFORMATIVE
It is essential that copyright empower artists to build on the works that came
before. However, there is more than one layer to that onion. There are levels of
abstraction as to how much an artist should be allowed to stand on the shoulders of
the past, and neither Seltzer nor Cariou were situations akin to no one being able to
write about star crossed lovers because it was locked up in copyright. At the same
time, courts generally should not be in the business of micro managing artistic
decisions. Doctrines other than fair use also contribute to artistic freedom to reuse
the past-such as the ability to use uncopyrighted ideas, scenes A faire, etc.-but
fair use itself necessarily calls for a balance in that it involves contributing to the
arts by favoring one of the works at issue. The proposals herein are aimed at
assisting in that balance under § 107.
However, the transformativeness subfactor need not do all of the balancing
239. See, e.g., Enriquez, supra note 3, at 4 ("[I]n much contemporary art, the artist's refusal to
articulate an identifiable intent is the point of the work. [A] standard [focusing on intent] therefore
forces the artist to choose between symbolic destruction of an intentionally ambiguous work in order to
win her case or literal destruction of the work upon losing.").
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alone. It is not necessary to configure it such that all uses that are "objectively"
unfair uses are deemed not transformative. Courts can account for the extent of
modifications in other factors and weigh those factors against the
transformativeness finding. And, as noted, transformativeness is not a binary
concept in that weighing. As Campbell noted, the factors must be considered
holistically, and the new transformative is simply one such factor.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, the battles over fair use are about issues that run deeper than how
transformativeness is defined. As Rebecca Tushnet phrased it, "[e]ven if we
abandoned transformativeness as an overriding fair use category, we would still
face the same disputes over which uses should be deemed productive or otherwise
fair." 240 She is surely correct. But because transformativeness helps decide which
uses prosper and which wilt, it is important to craft that definition carefully.241
Recent decisions like Seltzer have expanded that subfactor into a test so easy to
meet it begs for reduction. One resulting risk is not that transformativeness will
return to its proper parameters, but that the barber will take a bit too much off the
top. Further, a fair use standard that fails to balance the goals of copyright is a sign
that the scales need recalibration. Cases like Seltzer and Cariou have tipped the
scales too far towards fair use.
Although this Article has argued that this shift is problematic, some level of
inconsistency is not new. This is evidenced by, if nothing else, the several cases
where circuit court judges, district court judges, and Supreme Court justices
disagreed on the fair use merits.242  That inconsistency is also present in the
transformativeness subfactor.243  Inconsistency is expensive and chilling. For
secondary users who rely on fair use for their creations, the potential that a higher
court might correct an "erroneous" ruling is of little comfort; persisting in copyright
litigation is no small task. So, too, does unpredictability chill creative efforts.244
While fair use's malleability might be its strength, we buy it at a price.
At the same time, technology has made content creation increasingly accessible
to a wide array of artists. As the explosion of user-generated content on YouTube
and other sites has shown, content creators come in all ages and socio-economic
240. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 871.
241. 1 do not mean to suggest, by use of her quote, that Professor Tushnet would disagree with the
assertion that a clear definition of fair use is helpful.
242. Compare Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., No. Civ. 10-2103, 2011 WL 5834626, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (concluding copyright claims were "objectively [un]reasonable), with Seltzer, 725 F.3d 1170,
1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (labeling it "a close and difficult case"); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
510 U.S. 569 (1994) (district court reversed by circuit court which was reversed by Supreme Court).
243. Compare Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[T]he 'transformative
use' prong of the first § 107 factor weighs heavily against a finding of fair use [here].") with Cariou v.
Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[W]e see twenty-five of [Prince's works] as transformative as
a matter of law."). See also Gaylord v. U.S., 595 F.3d 1364, 1372-74 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting the
Court of Federal Claims' conclusion that the work at issue was transformative).
244. See, e.g., COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION, supra note 9.
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backgrounds, and young artists often borrow heavily from existing works. With a
worldwide audience at your fingertips and automated content programs like
Google's ContentlD, it is easier than ever to land on a rights holder's radar.245 In
the face of DMCA notices, lawsuits against individuals, and potential monetary
judgments that would cripple many families, an unpredictable fair use defense is-
for many artists-no defense at all; they cannot risk a loss (or even the expenses
associated with getting to a lawsuit). Fair use means you can hire a lawyer only if
you can afford a lawyer.246
Perhaps, though, fair use should expand. Copyright law has grown in breadth,
length, and potency in recent decades; shouldn't fair use expand in parallel?247
Perhaps a broader fair use would be better for the advancement of art and
expression. This Article has, for the most part, sought to reserve that divisive
normative question for another day. If, however, expansion is warranted, it should
be express and through an articulated standard that explains why content
transformativeness should override the limits placed on its subcategories like
parody. At a minimum, that is not what we received in Seltzer.
When the Supreme Court takes another § 107 case (or if Congress does actually
redraft § 107), fair use is ripe for clarification.248 But we need not reshape § 107
much to clear the waters. Instead, if courts defined transformativeness more
precisely and included guidance on issues like content transformation and the
ordinary observer approach, the doctrine would gain in clarity. Further, courts
should reiterate that works often have more than one purpose. These clarifications
would assist the countless individuals who rely upon § 107 in their creative efforts,
and they would pave a clearer path forward for the new transformative.
245. "How Content ID Works," YouTUBE HELP,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
246. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) ("[F]air use in America simply
means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.").
247. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 1, at 653 & nn.6-12 (describing emboldened copyright
provisions pertaining to scope, length, breadth of rights, and remedies, and making the argument that
fair use should expand in response).
248. Redrafting seems less likely. See generally Litman, supra note I (discussing successful
resistance to Congress creating new exemptions). Though, it is possible. See generally Pallante, supra
note 8 (calling for updates to domestic copyright law).
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